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SCHOOLS-NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO INSTRUCTION-THE
SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF '"FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC
EDUCATION" UNDER THE EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN ACT OF 1975
The parents of Amy Rowley, a deaf student in a public
elementary school,I alleged that the school board had denied Amy 2
a "free appropriate public education," ' 3 which the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 guarantees to all
handicapped children. 4 The plaintiffs requested that the school
provide Amy with the services of a qualified sign language
interpreter in all of her academic classes. 5  The school
1. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982). Amy Rowley was in second grade at the
Furnace Woods School in the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, Peekskill, New York, when
her parents filed the present suit on her behalf. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 530-31
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
2. 102 S. Ct. at 3039. Despite her handicap Amy Rowley retained minimal residual hearing and
had become an excellent lip reader. Id.
3. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(18) (West 1978). The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975 defines "free appropriate public education" as follows:
[S]pecial education and related services which (A) have been provided at public
expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the
standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool,
elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided
in conformity with the individualized education program required under section
1414(a) (5) of this title.
Id.
4. Id. § 1412(1). Section 1412 states in part: "In order to qualify for assistance under this
subchapter in any fiscal year, a State shall demonstrate to the Commissioner that the following
conditions are met: (1) The State has in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the right
to a free appropriate public education." Id.
5. 102 S. Ct. at 3039. The school provided Amy Rowley with a sign language interpreter during
a two week experimental period in her kindergarten year. The interpreter reported that Amy did not
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administration denied that request 6  and approved an
Individualized Education Plan7 (IEP) for the child's first grade year
that did not include such services. 8
A local independent examiner upheld the school
administration's decision. 9 The parents unsuccessfully appealed to
the New York Commissioner of Education.10 After a review of
these administrative decisions,"1 the federal district court entered
judgment for the plaintiff. 12 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed.13 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari and held that the provision of personalized instruction
with sufficient support services to permit the handicapped child to
need his services in that class because her teacher was extraordinarily sensitive to Amy's needs and
Amy resisted the interpreter's efforts. Rowley v. Board ofEduc., 483 F. Supp. at 530.
6. 102 S. Ct. at 3039. The administration decided not to provide an interpreter after consulting
with the district's Committee on the Handicapped, which had received evidence from Amy's
parents, her teacher, and others familiar with her academic and social progress. Id.
7. 20 U.S.C.A. 9 1401(19) (West 1978). Section 1401(19) defines "individualized education
program" in part as follows:
[A] written statement for each handicapped child developed in a meeting by a
representative of the local educational agency or an intermediate educational unit who
shall be qualified to provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed
instruction to meet the unique needs of handicapped children, the teacher, [and] the
parents or guardian of such child ....
Id.
8. 102 S. Ct. at 3039. Amy's first grade IEP provided for placement in a regular classroom with
the provision of a special FM wireless hearing aid, which could amplify the sound of the teacher's
voice to assist Amy's limited hearing capacity. In addition, the plan provided special instruction
from an instructor for the deaf for one hour each day and from a speech therapist for three hours each
week. Id.
9. Id. at 3040. Under the Act parents of handicapped children may bring their complaints with
respect to the child's identification, evaluation, and placement, or with respect to the provision of a
free appropriate public education to the child, before an impartial due process hearing at the local
level. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(b) (2) (West 1978).
10. 102 S. Ct. at 3040. The Act provides that following a local due process hearing "any party
aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal to the State
educational agency which shall conduct an impartial review of such hearing. The officer conducting
such review shall make an independent decision upon completion of such review." 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1415(c)(West 1978).
11. 102 S. Ct. at 3040. The Act provides that any party aggrieved by the decision reached in
administrative appeal who has exhausted the right to further administrative appeal shall have the
right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint in either a state or federal court. 20
U.S.C.A. § 1415(e) (2) (West 1978).
12. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In defining
"appropriate education," which the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
guarantees, the court rejected standards based on merely adequate education or an education to
enable the child to attain his full potential. Id. at 534 (construing 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(1) (West
1978)). Rather, the federal district court chose a standard between the two extremes that "would
require that each handicapped child be given an opportunity to achieve his full potential
commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children." 483 F. Supp. at 534. The district
court's standard of "appropriate education" could be applied by comparing the performance of a
handicapped student with that of a non-handicapped student of comparable ability. Id. The district
court ruled that the school should provide Amy with the services of a sign language interpreter
because it found that "Amy's academic education would be more 'appropriate' with than without an
interpreter." Id. at 536.
13. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 632 F.2d 945, 948 (2d Cir. 1980). Affirming the district court




benefit educationally from that instruction satisfied the
requirement of "free appropriate public education." '14 Board of
Education v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
Prior to the sixteenth century teachers made little effort to
educate deaf children since society classified the deaf as mentally
retarded. 15 In the eighteenth century public education of the deaf
began in Germany and France. 16 The French school of deaf
education emphasized a manual approach that involved hand
signals. 17 The German school tended to emphasize oral instruction
that relied on the use of speech.' 8 Advocates of these two diverse
approaches transplanted the sharp division in deaf educational
methodology to the United States in the nineteenth century,' 9 and
it has persisted to the present. 20
Deaf children in public schools face special problems not
encountered by other handicapped children. 2' Because deafness is
not a visible handicap, there is a tendency for educators and the
14. Board ofEduc. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3049 (1982). The Court further held:
[Sluch instruction and services must be provided at public expense, must meet the
State's educational standards, must approximate the grade levels used in the State's
regular education, and must comport with the child's IEP. In addition, the IEP, and
therefore the personalized instruction, should be formulated in accordance with the
requirements of the Act and, if the child is being educated in the regular classrooms of
the public education system, should be reasonably calculated to enable the child to
achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.
Id.
15. Large, Special Problems of the Deaf Under The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,
58 WASH. U.L.Q. 213, 223 (1980). Statements attributed to Aristotle that persons born deaf became
incapable of reason only strengthened the popular conviction that the deaf were uneducable. Id. One
of the earliest efforts to educate the deaf began during the 16th century when a monastery of San
Salvador in Spain established a school to educate a select group of wealthy deaf pupils. Id.
16. Id. at 224. The first teachers of the deaf were trained in Spain, but it was in France and
Germany that the first public education of the deaf, including the poor, began. Id.
17. J. PAHZ & C. PAHZ, TOTAL COMMUNICATION 15-18 (1978). Abbe de l'Epee, a French priest
who established the first free school for deaf students in Paris in 1755, was the originator of the
French school of deaf education. De l'Epee used sign language based on a single-handed alphabet as
the medium of communication for education of the deaf. The French priest trained a cadre of
teachers who carried on his approach to education of the deaf. This sign language or manual method
became the standard approach in France and wherever the influence of the French method traveled.
Id. 18. Id. at 18-20. In Germany Samuel Heinicke developed a method of education for the deaf
that emphasized speech and speech reading. This oral approach discouraged the use of sign language
as harmful to the education of the deaf. The oral approach became the standard German method. Id.
19. Large, supra note 15, at 226-27. Thomas Gallaudet, a minister who had studied education of
the deaf in France, set up the first permanent school for deaf children in the United States at
Hartford, Connecticut, in 1817. Gallaudet used the manual method of communication, and his
pioneering work gave the manual approach a firm head start at the many public schools for the deaf
that sprang up in the following years. Manualism, however, did not remain unchallenged in the
United States. After visiting European schools that employed the oral approach in 1843, Horace
Mann returned to the United States as a strong apostle of oralism. His influence, along with the
advocacy of Alexander Graham Bell, helped to popularize the use of oral education for the deaf in the
United States. Id.
20. Id. at 229. The battle over methodology in education of the deaf has persisted at least in part
because no method has worked sufficiently well to gain the uncritical support ofeducators. Id.
21. Id. at 238. The special problems of deaf children presently are of greater importance because
of the move toward mainstreaming handicapped children in regular classrooms. Id. at 244-45.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
public not to recognize it as a major handicap. 22 As a result of this
lack of recognition the educational system has frequently neglected
to provide the time and resources needed to help deaf children
compensate for their handicap. 23 The invisible nature of deafness
may lead to neglect of the special needs of the deaf child
mainstreamed in a regular classroom. 24 This neglect can occur
because the unusually quiet but normal-appearing deaf child is
likely to lose out in the competition for the teacher's time and
attention to other more visibly handicapped children and to
unhandicapped children. 25
Academic education depends on the communication of ideas
through the vehicle of spoken or written language. 26 Since deaf
children often have difficulty acquiring the use of language, the
handicap may seriously impede or block their academic
education. 27 Too often teachers and peers have labeled such
children slow learners or mentally retarded and have treated them
accordingly. 28
A deaf child in a regular classroom who does not have the use
of language becomes socially isolated and thereby loses one of the
major advantages of mainstreaming. 29 While specialized education
has become more available to handicapped children in recent
decades, in 1975 nearly one-half of the estimated eight million
handicapped children in the United States were not receiving
specialized education. 30
Two landmark federal court cases in 1971 and 1972 provided
22. Id. at 238. It is commonly thought, for example, that blindness is a more difficult handicap
to overcome than deafness. This view overlooks the fact that for most white collar professionals the
ability to communicate verbally is more important than the ability to see. Id.
23. Id. at 248. Actual experience with mainstreaming of handicapped children has not always
achieved the hopes of its advocates. To have a reasonable chance of success, mainstreaming requires
changes in class size, teacher preparation, and provision of special support services. Id. at 246.
24. Id. at 248. The deaf child's educational deficiency may not be apparent in the lower grades
in which learning is more visually oriented. The deficiency will more likely appear in the fourth or
fifth grades when the child cannot keep up with the reading and writing demands because of a
deficiency in language development. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. In the education process, the ability to communicate is more important than the ability to
see, touch, or walk. The infirmities of the blind or paraplegic child are less crucial to the learning
process than those of the deaf child. Id.
27. J. BIRCH, HEARING IMPAIRED CHILDREN IN THE MAINSTREAM 11-13 (1975). At least five
factors affect the educability of the hearing impaired child: the degree of the hearing defect, the
degree of hearing impairment within the speech range, the age of onset ofthe hearing loss, the child's
intelligence, and the instruction the child received in his very early years. Id.
28. Id. at 13-14. Children who are hearing impaired are frequently thought to be mentally
retarded. This type of inaccurate assessment may lead to serious curtailment of the child's
educational opportunities. Id.
29. Large, supra note 15, at 249-50. The deaf child is less likely than other handicapped children
to integrate socially in a class. Id.
30. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
1425, 1432. In 1975 only 71% of the deaf children and a mere 18% of the hard-of-hearing children
received specialized education. Id.
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the major impetus toward the legal guarantee of specialized public
education to all handicapped children. 31 Pennsylvania Association for
Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania32 and Mills v. Board of Education33
were significant cases in which federal district courts found a
constitutional basis for guaranteeing the right to a suitable public
education for handicapped children.
The plaintiffs in Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children34
alleged that Pennsylvania had denied them due process and equal
protection of the law35 under Pennsylvania statutes that allowed
officials to exclude retarded children classified as uneducable from
public schools. While the federal district court resolved the case by
enforcing a consent decree, it also discussed and commented
favorably on the plaintiffs' claims. 36  Although Pennsylvania
Association for Retarded Children did not provide binding precedent on
the question of the constitutional rights of handicapped children to
public education, the court's extensive and detailed decree did
provide the basis for later court decisions and legislation.3 7
The federal district court in Mills v. Board of Education38 ruled
that the school district's exclusion of handicapped children from
31. See Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D.
Pa. 1971) (equal protection requires provision of public education to mentally retarded children);
Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (due process requires provision of public
education to handicapped children on an equal basis with nonhandicapped children).
32. 334F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
33. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
34. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (E.D.
Pa. 1971). The federal district court certified the suit as a class action on behalf of all mentally
retarded persons in Pennsylvania to whom the state had denied or would deny access to a free public
education while under the age of 21. Id.
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. This amendment states in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
36. 334 F. Supp. at 1259. The court found that all mentally retarded persons can benefit from
education and training. Id. With respect to the plaintiffs' equal protection claim the court
commented: "Having undertaken to provide a free public education to all of its children, including
its exceptional children, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may not deny any mentally retarded
child access to a free public program of education and training." Id.
37. Id. at 1260. The court ordered Pennsylvania "to place each mentally retarded child in a
free, public program of education and training appropriate to the child's capacity" with
mainstreaming such a child in a regular classroom the preferred approach. Id. The court also ordered
that the state provide notice and due process hearings before a change in the educational placement
ofany retarded child. Id. at 1259.
38. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). The District of Columbia Board of Education had
excluded the original plaintiffs, seven black children, from public schools because of various alleged
mental and emotional deficiencies. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 870 (D.D.C. 1972).
The Mills court certified the suit as a class action on behalf of all school aged residents who were
eligible for free public education but who had been or would be excluded from such education. Id.
Because the defendants admitted that they had affirmative duties to the plaintiffs that they had failed
to perform, the court ordered summary judgment for the plaintiffs. Id. at 871.
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access to public education violated equal protection of law, which
the fifth amendment's due process clause guarantees.3 9 The Mills
court also ruled that the school district's failure to provide the
handicapped plaintiffs with adequate hearings and periodic review
with respect to their educational status violated their right to
procedural due process.40 The Mills court held that the school
district's inadequate finances could not excuse the denial of
educational rights to handicapped children. 4 1 If existing funds were
inadequate, "the available funds must be expended equitably in
such a manner that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly
supported education consistent with his needs and ability to benefit
therefrom. '42
The Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children and Mills cases
stirred hopes among advocates of rights for the handicapped that a
constitutional guarantee of appropriate specialized education for all
handicapped children would gain judicial acceptance. 43 The
Supreme Court partially dashed those hopes in 1973 when it held in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez"4 that education
was not a constitutionally protected fundamental right.45 The
Rodriquez Court found that the equal protection clause did not
39. Id. at 875. The Mills court adopted the reasoning of Hobson v. Hansen to find that "the
doctrine of equal educational opportunity - the equal protection clause in its application to public
school education - is in its full sweep a component of due process binding on the District under the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875 (quoting Hobson v.
Hansen, 268 F. Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967)). In applying the equal protection component of the
due process clause, the Mills court found that denying the plaintiffs a publicly supported education
while providing such education to other children violated the due process clause. 348 F. Supp. at
875. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment states in part that "[n]o person shall be...
deprived oflife, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
40. 348 F. Supp. at 875. In part the Mills court found that many plaintiffs and their class are
expelled or suspended from schools or instruction without any prior hearing or subsequent review.
Id. The Mills court held that due process requires a hearing prior to exclusion from school or
classification into a special program. Id. The court ordered the District of Columbia to give advance
notice to parents or guardians and, if there is an objection, to provide adequate hearings whenever
handicapped children are transferred, given a new placement, or denied a requested placement. Id.
at 880.
41. Id. at 876. The Mills court ordered the District of Columbia to provide to each child of
school age a suitable publicly-supported education regardless of the child's mental, physical, or
emotional disability or impairment. Id. at 878.
42. Id. at 876. The Mills court concluded that the inadequacies of the District of Columbia
Public School System could not be permitted to bear more heavily on the handicapped child than on
the normal child. Id.
43. See Krass, The Right to Public Education for Handicapped Children: A Primer for the New Advocate,
1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1016, 1023-63 (1976) (an examination of various constitutional theories and'
judicial precedents for establishing the right to a free public education for handicapped children).
44. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Plaintiffs in Rodriquez challenged the Texas system of financing public
schools based partially on the proceeds of an ad valorem tax on property within each school district.
The system resulted in unequal per pupil expenditures for public education between wealthier and
poorer districts. As residents of a poor district, the plaintiffs claimed that the school finance system
violated their right to equal protection. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1,
4-6 (1973).
45. Id. at 35. See Roos, The Potential Impact of Rodriquez on Other School Reform Litigation, 38 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 566, 567 (1973) (author maintains that the holding that education is not a
fundamental interest was the greatest loss to education reform advocates).
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require equal expenditure of public funds or provision of
qualitatively equal education to children attending schools in the
same state.
4 6
The Court implied, however, that an absolute deprivation of
public education might trigger judicial intervention. 47  The
Rodriquez decision and the passage of the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 by Congress have directed
attention away from a constitutional basis and toward a statutory
basis for establishing the right of handicapped children to an
appropriate public education. 48
In Board of Education v. Rowley, 49 the subject of this Comment,
the Supreme Court for the first time set out to provide an
operational definition of "free appropriate public education,"
which the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
requires.50 In addition, the Court sought to define the extent of the
review powers conferred on state and federal courts under the
Act.5 1 The Court looked first to the face of the Act for an
operational definition of "free appropriate public education.' '52
While admitting that the statutory definition was more cryptic than
clear,53 the Court reasoned that the definition provided by the Act
was the best indicator of legislative intent. 54
The Rowley Court noted that the language of the statute lacked
a substantive standard prescribing the level of education that public
schools must provide to handicapped children. 55 The Supreme
Court rejected the standard set forth by the lower courts that
required states to maximize the potential of handicapped children
46. 411 U.S. at 24. The Court in Rodriquez held that "at least where wealth is involved, the
Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages. Nor,
indeed, in view of the infinite variables affecting the educational process, can any system assure
equal quality of education except in the most relative sense." Id.
47. See id.
48. See Large, supra note 15, at 219.
49. 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
50. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3040 (1982) (construing 20 U.S.C.A.
5 1401(18) (West 1978)).
51. 102 S. Ct. at 3040.
52. Id. at 3041-42.
53. Id. The Court criticized the district court's finding that "the Act itself does not define
'appropriate education,' " but leaves the responsibility of giving content to the appropriate
education requirement "to the courts and hearing officers." Id. (quoting Rowley v. Board of Educ.,
483 F. Supp. 528, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
54. 102 S. Ct. at 3041-42. For the statutory definition of "free appropriate public education,"
see supra note 3. Section 1401(16) defines "special education" as "specially designed instruction, at
no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, including
classroom instruction, instruction in physical education, home instruction, and instruction in
hospitals and institutions." 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(16) (West 1978). Section 1401(17) defines "related
services" as "transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services ...
as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education. Id.
51401(17).
55. 102 S. Ct. at 3042.
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"commensurate with the opportunity provided to other
children. "56 Based on its examination of the Act's definitions the
Court concluded that if schools provided personalized instruction
with sufficient supportive services to permit the child to benefit
from the instruction and satisfied the other items on the definitional
checklist, the child was receiving the "free appropriate public
education," which the Act required. 57
The Rowley Court examined the Act's legislative history to
determine the intended meaning of "free appropriate
education.' '58 The Supreme Court found that the major concern
of Congress was to provide access to public education for the many
handicapped children that were excluded or misassigned. 59 The
Court held that "in seeking to provide such access to public
education, Congress did not impose upon the States any greater
substantive educational standard than would be necessary to make
such access meaningful.' '60
Noting that the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children and
Mills cases had provided a major impetus for passage of the Act, the
Rowley Court asserted that neither case required any particular
substantive level of education.6 1 In the Court's view both cases
relied primarily on procedural safeguards in formulating
personalized educational programs for the handicapped.62 Since
these two cases played a seminal role in the development of the Act,
the Court reasoned that Congress intended to incorporate the
major principles of these cases into the Act. 63
56. Id. (quoting Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 534). The New York federal district court set forth its
standard of "appropriate education" as one that would give each child "an opportunity to achieve
his full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children." Rowley, 483 F.
Supp. at 534. See Note, Enforcing The Right to an "Appropriate" Education: The Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1103, 1125-26 (1979) (proposing a standard that
would require "service aimed at developing the child's intellectual capacity to the same degree that
the school sought to develop the 'normal' abilities of its nonhandicapped students").
57. 102 S. Ct. at 3042. The Court provided a "definitional checklist" requiring "that such
instruction and services be provided at public expense and under public supervision, meet the State's
educational standards, approximate the grade levels used in the State's regular education, and
comport with the child's IEP." Id. at 3041-42.
58. Id. at 3042-46.
59. Id. at 3043. For Congressional findings on the status of education for handicapped children,
see S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD. Naws 1425,
1432.
60. 102 S. Ct. at 3043. The Court summarized its findings on congressional intent with respect
to a substantive educational standard required by the Act: "Thus, the intent of the Act was more to
open the door of public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee
any particular level of education once inside." Id.
61. Id. at 3044. For a review of the relevant findings of the Pennsylvania Ass'nfor Retarded Children
and Mills cases, see supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
62. 102 S. Ct. at 3044. See Keim, The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 10 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 110, 134-36 (1976) (points out problems with judicially formulated substantive
educational standards and favors the procedural path to adequate education).
63. 102 S. Ct. at 3044.
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From its examination of the Act's legislative history, the Court
concluded that Congress had equated the provision of some
specialized educational services with "appropriate education. "64
The Court interpreted the congressional finding that of the more
than eight million handicapped children "only 3.9 million such
children are receiving appropriate education" to mean that
Congress intended to equate the provision of any specialized
education with an "appropriate education.' '65 From this premise
the Rowley Court reasoned that Congress required no more than
personalized education to meet the Act's standard. 66
The Act does not impose a standard of educational equality for
the handicapped, the Court argued, because such a standard would
be unworkable and unmeasurable.6 7 In the Court's view, the mere
equal provision of services to handicapped and nonhandicapped
would fall short of the Act's requirement. 68 A standard based on
maximizing each handicapped child's potential, however, would
exceed the intent of Congress. 69 The Court's analysis found no
equal educational opportunity requirement in the Pennsylvania
Association for Retarded Children and Mills cases. 70 The Court noted
that in two previous cases it had rejected the argument that the
equal protection clause required equal expenditure on the
education of each child. 71
The Rowley Court found that Congress had intended that a
"free appropriate public education" include a requirement to
confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child. 72
Acknowledging the difficulty of formulating a general standard of
64. Id. at 3045-46. Observing that the Senate report had characterized the 3.9 million children
receiving specialized education as "receiving an appropriate education," the Supreme Court
concluded that Congress had viewed children "served" by specialized education as receiving an
"appropriate education." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1975
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1425, 1432).
65. 102 S. Ct. at 3045-46.
66. Id. at 3046. The Rowley Court found that by characterizing handicapped children who were
"served" as children "receiving an appropriate education," the Senate and House reports indicated
that Congress believed that a school district provides an appropriate education when it provides
personalized educational services. Id.
67. Id. at 3047. In the Court's view, "[tihe theme of the Act is 'free appropriate public
education,' a phrase which is too complex to be captured by the word 'equal' whetner one is speaking
ofopportunities or services." Id.
68. Id. In rejecting an equality-based standard the Court asserted that "to speak in terms of
'equal' services in one instance gives less than what is required by the Act and in another instance
more." Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. The Rowley Court noted that Mills and Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children held simply
that handicapped children may not be excluded entirely from public education and that the decisions
did not mandate absolute equality ofopportunity regardless ofcapacity. Id.
71. Id. For a discussion of the Court's holding that the equal protection clause does not require
equal expenditure on each child's education, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
72. 102 S. Ct. at 3048.
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educational benefit, the Court declined to establish such a test. 7
3
The Supreme Court found, however, that for a handicapped child
mainstreamed in a regular classroom, the school's system of
grading and advancement constitutes an important factor in
determining educational benefit. 74
The Rowley Court concluded that a state satisfies the
requirement of a "free appropriate public education" when it
provides a handicapped child with the following elements. First, the
state must provide personalized instruction with sufficient support
services to permit the child to benefit educationally from the
instruction. Second, the state must provide instruction and services
that are at public expense, that meet the state's educational
standards, that approximate the grade levels used in the state's
regular education, and that comport with the child's IEP. Third,
the state must provide an IEP and personalized instruction that are
in conformance with the Act's requirements and that are
reasonably calculated to enable a child who is mainstreamed in a
regular classroom to achieve passing marks and to advance from
grade to grade. 75
The Court next turned to the second issue raised by the Rowley
case: the role of state and federal courts in exercising the review
powers granted by section 1415 of the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act. 76 While Congress intended the
authority of courts to stretch beyond mere review of state
compliance with the Act's procedural requirements, in the Court's
view Congress had not intended that courts have a free hand to
impose substantive standards of review not derived from the Act
itself.7 7 The Rowley Court reasoned from the Act's procedural
73. Id. at 3049. Rather than establishing a general standard of educational benefit, the Court
chose to confine its inquiry to the specifics of the case before it. See id. The Rowley Court found that
the plaintiff had received substantial specialized instruction and related services and had performed
above average in regular classrooms. Id.
74. Id. The Court clarified its position on its standard of educational benefit for mainstreaming
handicapped children in the following note:
We do not hold today that every handicapped child who is advancing from grade to
grade in a regular public school system is automatically receiving a "free appropriate
public education." In this case, however, we find Amy's academic progress, when
considered with the special services and professional consideration accorded by the
Furnace Woods school administrators, to be dispositive.
Id. n.25.
75. Id. at 3049.
76. Id. at 3050. The scope ofjudicial review under the Act is set forth in S 1415(e) (2), which
states in part: "In any action brought under this paragraph the court shall receive the records of the
administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its
decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is
appropriate." 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e) (2) (West 1978).
77. 102 S. Ct. at 3050-51. The Supreme Court warned that the provision that a reviewing court
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specificity and substantive imprecision that adequate compliance
with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much, if
not all, of what Congress intended in the way of substantive content
in an IEP.7 8
Following its discussion of judicial review powers, the Court
held that in suits under section 1415(e) (2) courts should confine
their inquiry to two issues: whether the state has complied with the
procedures set forth in the Act79 and whether the IEP developed
through the Act's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the
child to receive educational benefits.80 The Court held that when
these two requirements are met the state has complied with the
obligations imposed by Congress and courts can require no more. 81
Finally, the Court cautioned lower courts against imposition of
their preferences in educational methodology upon the states. 82
Thus, the Court in Rowley held that a state satisfies the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act's requirement of a
"free appropriate education" when it provides personalized
instruction with sufficient support services, in conformance with a
procedurally-correct IEP, to permit the child to benefit
educationally from the instruction.8 3 The Rowley Court also held
that a court acting under section 1415(e) (2) of the Act should limit
its inquiry to procedural compliance with the Act and to
determination that the IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the
must base its decision on the preponderance of evidence did not allow the courts to substitute their
own notions ofsound educational policy for those of school authorities. Id. at 3051.
78. Id. at 3050. Noting that the judicial review powers are found in 5 1415 of the Act, entitled
"Procedural Safeguards," the Court found this placement an indication of legislative intent to
emphasizejudicial review of procedural compliance. Id.
79. Id. at 3051. The Court delineated the extent of the procedural inquiry in the following note:
This inquiry will require a court not only to satisfy itself that the State has adopted the
state plan, policies, and assurances required by the Act, but also to determine that the
State has created an IEP for the child in question which conforms with the
requirements of5 1401(19).
Id. n.27.
80. Id. at 3051. The Court clarified its educational benefit standard in the following note:
"When the handicapped child is being educated in the regular classrooms of a public school system,
the achievement of passing marks and advancement from grade to grade will be one important factor
in determining educational benefit." Id. n.28.
81. Id. at 3051.
82. Id. See also Large, supra note 15, at 229-38 (comparing various methods ofeducating the deaf
and noting the controversy between adherents of the various methods).
83. 102 S. Ct. at 3052. Noting that the courts below had failed to find any procedural
noncompliance, the Rowley Court held that "the findings of neither court would support a conclusion
that Amy's educational program failed to comply with the substantive requirements of the Act." Id.
The Court further held that because Amy was receiving personalized instruction and related services
calculated to meet her educational needs, the Act did not require the provision of a sign language
interpreter. Id. The Court reversed the decision of the appeals court and remanded the case for
further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Id.
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child to receive educational benefits. 84
Since the Rowley case is the first in which the Court has
interpreted any provision of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975,85 and since the Rowley decision set forth some
rather specific guidelines to schools and courts, this decision may
have far-reaching implications for public education of handicapped
children. It is too early to say with any certainty what these
implications may be, but some guarded speculation may be in
order.
In formulating a fairly restrictive standard of "appropriate
education," the Court foreclosed claims that the Act requires
specific services and methods of instruction beyond those required
to permit the child to benefit educationally. 86 This does not mean
that existing federal, state, and school system substantive standards
for education of handicapped children will automatically decline.8 7
The maintenance and improvement of those standards, however,
probably now will depend to a greater extent on the political
process than on judicial intervention.
The Rowley decision appears to limit the range of discretion
available to courts in their review of disputes arising under the
"appropriate education" standard of the Act. 88  The Rowley
standard seems to limit judicial inquiry to questions concerning
procedural compliance and the adequacy of an IEP to confer
educational benefit in a particular case. 89 Courts may not substitute
their judgments in educational methodology for those of states and
schools. 90 Since the Supreme Court rejected any single measurable
84. Id. at 3051. The dissenters found the majority's standard for an "appropriate education"
inadequate. Id. at 3054-56 (White, Brennan, & Marshall, J.J., dissenting). While agreeing that the
Act lacks a good substantive standard of "appropriate education," the dissenters argued for a broad
interpretation of that term, since an intent to restrict the meaning of the term was not apparent from
,he face of the statute or its legislative history. Id. at 3054. In the dissenters' view, the legislative
history revealed an intent "to give handicapped children an educational opportunity commensurate
with that given other children." Id. at 3055. The dissenters found the Court's standard of
"appropriate education" so inadequate that it apparently would be sufficient "for a deaf child such
as Amy to be given a teacher with a loud voice, for she would benefit from that service." Id. The
dissenters also challenged the Court's standard ofjudicial review as too restrictive and not in keeping
with the intent of Congress. Id. at 3056. Congress intended the courts to undertake a substantive
review and to consider the issues under review de novo, instead of relying on the conclusions of the
state agency, according to the dissenters. Id. Also, in the dissenters' view, courts must inevitably
make judgments under the Act as to whether a given educational method is "appropriate" for a
particular handicapped child. Id. at 3057.
85.Jd. at 3041.
86. See id. at 3049.
87. See Stotland & Mancuso, TheAfterrnath ofRowley - Business As Usual, 1982 ED. HANDICAP. L.
REP., July 23, 1982, at AC 159. The commentator believes that the result of Rowley may be
unfortunate for some exceptionally bright handicapped children, but that its long-term impact on the
majority of handicapped children is limited.
88. See 102 S. Ct. at 3051.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 3052.
[VOL. 59:629
CASE COMMENT
standard of educational appropriateness for all handicapped
children, courts will need to consider the totality of factors in
deciding the appropriateness question in each individual case.
The Rowley decision did not specifically describe the minimum
level of educational benefit required by the Act. 91 While normal
progress will be an important criterion of educational benefit for
mainstreamed children, it will not be the only factor considered. 92
Since the Supreme Court declined to formulate a standard of
minimum educational benefit required by the Act, courts must
decide the minimum benefit question on a case by case basis with
little guidance from the Supreme Court.
In a 1974 decision the Supreme Court of North Dakota in In
the Interest of G.H.93 held that the Constitution of North Dakota
guarantees "equal educational opportunity" to a handicapped
child. 94 The court also found such a right under the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution. 95 The court
was not called upon to provide a substantive standard of "equal
educational opportunity" for handicapped children, and it did not
offer such a standard. 96 It is, however, readily inferable from the
facts of the case that the standard of equal educational opportunity
includes specialized education and supportive services. 97 It is
possible that the North Dakota Supreme Court may in a future case
adopt substantive standards to implement the right of equal
educational opportunity for handicapped children under the North
Dakota Constitution.
With its decision in Rowley the United States Supreme Court
has reaffirmed the Act's procedural guarantees and the right to
education reasonably calculated to confer educational benefit. In
91. See id. at 3049. In declining to formulate a standard of educational benefit, the Court
acknowledged the difficulty ofestablishing a single general standard. Id.
92. See id. at 3049.
93. 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974). In Interest of G.H. a local school district was ordered to pay the
educational costs of a handicapped child who was residing and receiving specialized education
outside of the district on the theory that if the district had the facilities to educate the child, she would
have continued to live there. In the Interest of G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441, 448 (N.D. 1974).
94. Id. at 447. The North Dakota Supreme Court asserted that denial of equal educational
opportunity violates the equal protection provision and the due process and privileges and
immunities clauses ofthe North Dakota Constitution. Id. See N.D. CONST. art. I, % 12, 21, 22.
95. 218 N.W.2d at 447. Viewing the child's multiple handicaps as placing her in an inherently
suspect classification, the court held that "depriving her of a meaningful educational opportunity
would be just the sort of denial of equal protection which has been held unconstitutional in cases
involving discrimination based on race and illegitimacy and sex." Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
96. 218 N.W.2d at 447. The court was not called on to set forth substantive educational
standards because the child was receiving specialized education and related services at a school for
crippled children. Id.
97. See id. The handicapped child in question was receiving specialized education in a special
school for crippled children. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court described the type of education
guaranteed to the handicapped child as a "meaningful education," although it did not further define
the term. See id.
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the same decision the Court appears to have foreclosed judicial
formulation of a standard of appropriate education beyond that
immediately derived from the face of the Act. Finally, courts are
left to decide the type of education that is sufficient to be
appropriate on a case by case basis.
JOHN H. BURNS
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ADDENDUM
The Court of Claims decision in Hardee v. United States, which
is the subject of this Case Comment, was reversed by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit subsequent to the writing of this
Comment. Thus, the Case Comment discusses the decision of the
Court of Claims rather than that of the court of appeals. Because
the IRS has not acquiesced in the holding of the court of appeals,
the matter of interest-free loans is still likely to be a subject of
litigation. Accordingly, the decision of the Claims Court is
demonstrative of the reasoning a court may follow in future
interest-free loan litigation.
